Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is used in many security systems due to its small key size and high security as compared to the other cryptosystems. In many well-known security systems substitution box (S-box) is the only non-linear component. Recently, it is shown that the security of a cryptosystem can be improved by using dynamic S-boxes instead of static S-boxes. This fact necessitates the construction of new secure S-boxes. In this paper, we propose an efficient method for the generation of S-boxes based on a class of Mordell elliptic curves (MECs) over prime fields by defining different total orders. The proposed technique is developed carefully so that it output an Sbox inheriting the properties of the underlying MEC for each input in constant time. Furthermore, it is shown by the computational results that the proposed method is capable of generating cryptographically strong S-boxes as compared to some of the existing S-boxes.
Introduction
Cryptography deals with the techniques to secure the private data. In these techniques, the data is transformed into an unreadable form by using some keys so that the adversaries cannot extract any useful information. S-box is the only non-linear component of many well-known cryptosystems including AES. It is therefore the security of such cryptosystems solely depends on the cryptographic properties of their S-box. Shannon [1] , proved that a cryptosystem is secure if it can create confusion and diffusion in the data up to a certain level. An S-box is cryptographically strong enough to create desire confusion and diffusion if it satisfies certain tests including the test of non-linearity, approximation, strict avalanche, bit independence and algebraic complexity.
Nowadays, AES is considered to be the most secured and widely used cryptosystem, and hence many cryptographers studied its S-box. The study in [2, 3, 4, 5] reveals that the AES S-box is vulnerable against algebraic attacks because of its sparse polynomial representation. It is also noticed that a cryptosystem based on a single S-box is unable to generate desirable security if the data is highly correlated [6, 7] . Furthermore, it is shown that the security of a cryptosystems can be improved by using dynamic S-boxes instead of static S-boxes [8] . Due to these reasons many researchers have proposed new S-box generation techniques based on different mathematical structures including algebraic, and differential equations. For an S-box design technique, it is necessary that the resultant S-box: (a) inherits the properties of the underlying mathematical structure. This is an important requirement which leads to the efficient generation and better understanding of the cryptographic properties of the S-box; (b) satisfies the security tests; and (c) is generated in less time and space complexity. Of course, an S-box generation technique with high time complexity is not suitable for the cryptosystems using multiple, and dynamic S-boxes. Liu et al. [9] presented an improved AES S-box based on an algebraic method. Cui et al. [10] used an affine function to generate an S-box with 253 non-zero terms in its polynomial representation. Tran et al. [11] used composition of a Gray code instead of affine mapping with the AES S-box to generate an S-box with high algebraic complexity. Khan et al. [12, 13] proposed different methods for the generation of cryptographically strong S-boxes based on a generalization of Gray S-box, and affine functions. Azam [6] used the later Sboxes for the encryption of confidential images. Chaotic maps including Baker, logistic, and Chebyshev maps are used to generate new S-boxes in [14, 15, 16] . Similarly, elliptic curves (ECs) are also used in the field of cryptography for the development of highly secure cryptosystems. Miller [17] presented an EC based security system which has smaller key size and higher security as compared to RSA. Jung et al. [18] developed a link between the points on hyper-elliptic curves and non-linearity of an S-box. Hayat et al. [19] for the first time used EC over a prime field for the generation of S-box. In this scheme, an S-box is generated by using the x-coordinates of the points on the EC followed by the modulo operation 256. Although the technique is capable of generating cryptographically strong S-boxes, but the output is uncertain. That is, for each set of input parameters the algorithm does not necessarily output an S-box. Furthermore, the time complexity of this scheme is O(p), where p ≥ 257 is the prime in the underlying EC.
The purpose of this article is to develop such a novel and efficient S-box generation technique based on a finite Mordell elliptic curve (MEC) which generates secure S-box inheriting the properties of the underlying MEC for each set of input parameters. To achieve this, we defined some typical type of total orders on the points on the MEC, and then used y-coordinates instead of xcoordinates to obtain an S-box. The remaining paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some basic definitions and results related to EC are discussed. The proposed algorithm is described in Section 3. Section 4 contains the security analysis, and a comparison of the proposed S-box design technique with some of the existing techniques. Finally conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Preliminaries
For a prime p, and two non-negative integers a, b ≤ p − 1, the EC E p,a,b over the prime field F p is defined to be the collection of infinity point O, and all ordered pairs (x, y) ∈ F p × F p satisfying the equation
We call p, a, and b the parameters of the EC E p,a,b . An approximation for the total number of points #E p,a,b on E p,a,b can be obtained by using Hasse's formula [20] |#E
Mordell elliptic curve (MEC) is a special kind of elliptic curve with a = 0. The significance of MEC E p,0,b is that some of the MECs have exactly p+1. The following Theorem is taken from [21] gives the information about such MECs.
Theorem 1 Let p > 3 be a prime such that p ≡ 2(mod 3). Then for each b ∈ F p , the MEC E p,0,b has exactly p + 1 distinct points, and has each integer in [0, p − 1] exactly once as a y-coordinate.
Description of the Proposed S-box Designing Technique
In this section, we give an informal intuition of our proposed method. Our aim is to develop such an S-box generation technique based on MEC which outputs an S-box: (a) in constant time for each set of input parameters; (b) that inherits the properties of the underlying MEC; and (c) having high security against cryptanalysis. Note that the S-box design technique proposed by Hayat et al. [19] does not satisfy condition (a) and (b). One of the possible way of designing such technique is to input that EC which contains all values from 0 to 255 without repetition. It is, therefore, the proposed algorithm takes an MEC E p≡2,b as input, and uses y-coordinates to generate an S-box instead of xcoordinates. Now the next task is to use these y-coordinates in such a way that the resultant S-box inherits the properties of the underlying MEC. Of course, the usage of some arithmetic operations such as modulo operation on the ycoordinates to get an S-box will destroy the structure of the underlying MEC. It is therefore, we used the concept of total order on the MEC to get an S-box. Order theory is intensively used in formal methods, programming languages, logic, and statistic analysis. Now the natural question is how to define different orderings on the MEC. Note that for each x value of MEC, there are two y values. Thus, we can divide the orderings on MEC into two categories: (1) one is that in which the two y values of each x appear consecutively; and (2) the other one contains those orderings in which the two y values of each x do not appear consecutively. Based on this fact, we defined three different type of orderings on the MEC to generate three different S-boxes for a given MCE E p≡2,b .
The proposed orderings on a MEC E p≡2,b
The orderings used in the proposed method are discussed below.
(1) A natural ordering on MEC: We define a natural ordering ≺ N on E p≡2,b based on x-coordinates as follows
where (
The aim of this ordering is to order the points on the MEC in such a way that the x-coordinates are in non-decreasing order, and the two y values corresponding to each x appear consecutively.
The next two orderings are introduced based on the following observation deduced from Theorem 1 to diffuse the y-coordinates on a MEC.
Observation: For any two distinct points (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) on the MEC E p≡2,b , and either
(2) A diffusion ordering on MEC: An ordering is defined on E p≡2,b to diffuse the two y values of each x. Let (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) be any two points on E p≡2,b , the diffusion ordering ≺ D is defined to be
Lemma 2 The relation ≺ D is a total order on the MEC E p≡2,b .
Proof. For each (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ E p≡2,b , we have x 1 + y 1 = x 1 + y 1 , and therefore (x 1 , y 1 ) ≺ D (x 1 , y 1 ). This implies that ≺ D is reflexive. Next, we need to show that ≺ D satisfies the antisymmetric property. Thus, for (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ E p≡2,b , suppose that (x 1 , y 1 ) ≺ D (x 2 , y 2 ), and (x 2 , y 2 ) ≺ D (x 1 , y 1 ) hold. This implies that x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 . This is because of the fact that x 1 + y 1 < x 2 + y 2 , and x 2 + y 2 < x 1 + y 1 are the only cases for which the supposition and x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 are true, which eventually imply that
Now if x 1 = x 2 , then by the supposition and the fact x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 , we have x 1 < x 2 and x 2 < x 1 , which lead to the contradiction x 1 = x 2 . Thus x 1 + y 1 = x 2 + y 2 and x 1 = x 2 hold, which ultimately imply that y 1 = y 2 , and therefore (x 1 , y 1 ) = (x 2 , y 2 ). Now, to prove the transitivity property, suppose that (
, then x 1 < x 2 and x 2 < x 3 , and hence x 1 + y 1 = x 3 + y 3 and x 1 < x 3 . This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3 The relation ≺ M is a total order on the MEC E p≡2,b .
Lemma 3 can be proved by using the similar arguments as used in the proof of Lemma 2. The effect of these orderings ≺ N , ≺ D and ≺ M on y-coordinates of MEC E 101≡2,1 is shown in Figure 1 Table 1 . It is evident from the results that each ordering has different effect on the y-coordinates of the underlying MEC.
The proposed construction technique
Let E p≡2,b be a Mordell elliptic curve (MEC), where p ≥ 257. The lower bound on the prime p is 257 for the proposed method so that MEC has at least 256 
It is clear from Theorem 1 that S H p,b is a bijection, which further implies that the proposed method generates an S-box for each set of input parameters. 
Security Analysis and Comparison
Several standard tests are applied on the S-boxes obtained by the proposed method to test their cryptographic strength. A brief introduction to these se- 
Non-Linearity (NL)
It is important for an S-box to create confusion in the data up to a certain level to keep the data secure from the adversaries. The confusion creation capability of an S-box S over the Galois Field GF (2 8 ) is measured by its non-linearity N (S), which is defined below
where α ∈ GF (2 8 ), γ ∈ GF (2), β ∈ GF (2 8 )\{0} and "·" represents dot product over GF (2) . An S-box with high NL is capable of generating high confusion in the data. However, it is also shown in [22] that an S-box with high NL may not satisfy other cryptographic properties. The NL of some of the newly constructed Sboxes is listed in Table 5 . Note that each listed S-box has NL 106, which is large enough to create high confusion.
Approximation Attacks
A cryptographically strong S-box must have high resistance against approximation attacks. The approximation attacks can be divided into two categories namely linear approximation attacks, and differential approximation attacks which are explained below.
Linear Approximation Probability (LAP)
The resistance of an S-box S against linear approximation attacks is measured by calculating its maximum number L(S) of coincident input bits with the output bits. The mathematical expression of L(S) is as follows
where α ∈ GF (2 8 ) and β ∈ GF (2 8 )\{0}. An S-box S is said to be highly resistive against linear approximation attacks if it has low value of L(S). The LAP of the newly generated S-boxes is listed in Table 6 . The average LAP of all of the listed S-boxes is 0.1371 which is very low, and hence the proposed technique is capable of generating S-boxes with high resistance against linear approximation attacks. 
Differential Approximation Probability (DAP)
The strength of an S-box against differential approximation attacks is measured by calculating its DAP. For an S-box S, the DAP D(S) is the maximum probability of a specific change y in the output bits S(x) when the input bits x are changed to x ⊕ x i.e.,
where x, y ∈ GF (2 8 ), and "⊕" is bit-wise addition over GF (2) . The smaller is the value of DAP, the higher is the security of the S-box against differential approximation attacks. The experimental results of DAP on the newly generated S-boxes are presented in Table 7 . It is evident from Table  7 that the newly generated S-boxes have high resistance against differential attacks.
Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)
The diffusion creation capability of an S-box is calculated by SAC. The SAC of an S-box S is the measure of change in output bits when a single input bit is changed. The SAC of an S-box S with boolean functions S i ,where 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, is computed by calculating an eight dimensional square matrix M (S) = [m ij ] by using each of the eight elements α j ∈ GF (2 8 ) with only one non-zero bit as
where w(v) denotes the number of non-zero bits in the vector v. SAC test is fulfilled, if all entries of M (S) are close to 0.5. The entries of SAC matrix corresponding to each newly generated S-boxes S N 1667,351 , S D 3299,1451 and S M 4229,2422 are plotted in a linear order in Figure 2 . The average of minimum, and maximum values of M (S) corresponding to each of the newly generated S-boxes are 0.4115 and 0.6094, respectively. Table 8 clearly shows that the Sboxes generated by the proposed method based on MEC is capable of generating high diffusion in the data. 
Bit Independence Criterion (BIC)
BIC is also an important test to measure the diffusion creation strength of an S-box. The main idea of this test is to investigate the dependence of a pair of output bits when an input bit is reversed. The BIC of an S-box S over GF (2 8 ) with S i boolean functions is also calculated by computing a square matrix N (S) = [n ij ] of dimension eight as follows
Of course n ii = 0. An S-box is said to be good if all off-diagonal values of its BIC matrix are near to 0.5. The experimental results of this test on the newly generated S-boxes S N 1667,351 ,S D 3299,1451 and S M 4229,2422 , excluding the value 0, are shown in a linear order in Figure 3 . The minimum, and maximum values of BIC matrix N (S) of each of the newly generated S-boxes are listed in Table 9 . It is evident from Figure 3 and Table 9 that the S-boxes generated by the proposed methods are strong enough to generate high diffusion in the data.
Algebraic Complexity(AC)
The resistance of an S-box against algebraic attacks is measured by computing its linear polynomial. The AC of an S-box is the number of non-zero terms in its linear polynomial. The greater is the AC, the greater is the security of the S-box against algebraic attacks. The AC of the newly generated S-boxes is computed, and is presented in Table 10 . The minimum, and maximum values of AC of the newly generated S-boxes are 253, and 255, respectively, which are very close to the optimal value 255. Thus, the proposed method is able to generate S-boxes with good AC based on MEC.
Comparison and Discussion
A comparison of the security efficiency of the proposed S-box design technique with some of the existing techniques [14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] is presented in this section by comparing the cryptographic properties of their S-boxes. The cryptographic properties of the S-boxes used in this comparison are listed in Table 11 . Note that the non-linearity (NL) of the S-boxes S N 1667,351 , S D 3299,1451 and S M 4229,2422 is greater than that of the S-boxes in [14, 15, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30] , and hence the newly generated S-boxes create better confusion in the data as compared to the later S-boxes. This implies that the proposed technique is capable of generating S-boxes with good NL as compared to some of the other existing techniques. Moreover, the linear approximation probability (LAP) of the newly generated S-boxes is better than the LAP of the S-boxes in [14, 15, 16, 28, 29, 30] , while their differential approximation probability (DAP) is at most the DAP of the S-boxes in [14, 15, 16, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30] . Hence, the S-boxes generated by the proposed technique have same or better security against approximation attacks as compared to the other S-boxes. Similarly, the SAC, BIC and AC test results of the newly generated S-boxes are comparable with the S-boxes listed in Table 11 . Hence, the proposed S-box generation technique based on MEC is capable of generating cryptographically strong Sboxes as compared to some of the existing S-box construction techniques based on different mathematical structures. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm takes constant time for the generation of an S-box, while the method based on EC in [19] takes O(p) time, where p is the prime of the underlying EC. This implies that the proposed algorithm is fast as compared to the method in [19] .
Conclusion
In this article, we presented an S-box design technique based on y-coordinates of a finite Mordell elliptic curve (MEC) where prime is congruent to 2 modulo 3. The technique uses some special type of total orders on the points of the MEC, and generates an S-box in constant time. Several standard security tests are performed on the S-boxes generated by the proposed method to analyze its cryptographic efficiency. Experimental results show that the newly generated S-boxes are cryptographically strong. Furthermore, a comparison of some of the newly generated S-boxes with S-boxes generated by some of the existing techniques is also performed. It is evident from the comparison that the proposed method is capable of generating more secure S-boxes as compared to some of the existing S-box design techniques.
